TENANCY IN COMMON -PURCHASE OF PROPERTY BY CO-TENANT AFTER EXPIRATION OF STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REDEMPTION FROM TAX SALE.-
The plaintiff and the defendant were husband and wife, owning land as tenants in common. In 1921 the property was sold at a tax sale to X. Two years later, after the statutory period of redemption had expired, the defendant paid the amount of the taxes to X, who conveyed the land to the defendant as her separate estate. Throughout this time and until 1924, the plaintiff and the defendant lived together on this land. In 1924 they were divorced, no mention being made of the property in the divorce proceedings. In this suit by the plaintiff to recover an undivided one-half interest in the property, the trial court decreed that the land be sold, and that after deducting the amount paid by the defendant for the repurchase, one-half the proceeds be paid to the plaintiff. From this decree the defendant appealed. Held, that the purchase of a tax title by one co-tenant, even after the period of redemption has expired, inures to the benefit of all the co-tenants. Judgment affirmed. Bush v. Bush, 275 S. W. io96 (Tex. Civ. App.).
A co-tenant who buys in property at a tax sale or redeems from another who bought it in, does so for the benefit of all co-tenants. Whatever may be said of the doctrine that a fiduciary relation arises out of a co-tenancy per se, its existence in the principal case can hardly be questioned, where husband and wife were living together on the land. It would seem, furthermore, that this fiduciary relation was properly held to have continued as long as the parties remained in joint possession, despite the expiration of the redemption period.
TORTS -CoNsPIRACY-INTERFERENCE WITH TRADE OR BUSINESs.-At the instance of a union of retail news-agents of which he was a member, the plaintiff, formerly a customer of R, a wholesale news-agent, transferred his custom to W, another wholesaler. The union requested this action because R was supplying newspapers to a dealer who had opened a shop in violation of a so-called "distance limit policy" of the union. The defendants were a committee representing the publishers and considered the "distance limit policy" as injurious to their interests. In order to compel the plaintiff to return to R, the defendants threatened to cut off the supplies W obtained from them directly and also to quit supplying S, another distributor who had dealings with W, as long as W continued to supply the plaintiff. The plaintiff brought suit for an injunction, which was granted in the lower court. The decree was reversed by the Court of Appeal, and the plaintiff appealed to the House of Lords. Held, that the defendants had not committed nor threatened to commit any wrong against the plaintiff. Appeal dismissed. Sorrel v. Smith, [1925] Various grounds are taken: that the defendants in the principal case acted without malevolence or spite; that the real purpose of the combination was to promote the defendants' trade and therefore justifiable; that there was no actionable conspiracy, i.e., no combination 'for the sole purpose of inflicting injury. This disagreement demonstrates that very few rules or principles have yet crystallized in this branch of the law. On the facts of each case a judgment must be passed, whether, in view of, the end sought to be attained by the defendant, the means he employs should be considered as improper. That judgment will reflect the social and economic policy of the community as understood by the court. For a full discussion of the principles involved, see 2 HAlv. L. If the competition is unfair, the plaintiff seems clearly entitled to relief if he can show loss of customers. This can be done in the present case, since the plaintiff had a patent on the article in question. In the absence of this circumstance it is doubtful whether the plaintiff could show sufficient injury. What competitive methods are unfair, depends on views of public policy, trade morality and economic soundness. See Howe Scale
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